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Abstract
This Note argues that the conduct-and-effects test set out in Dodd-Frank should not extend to
private rights of action under §10(b) of the Exchange Act. Part I discusses three principle ideas
key to understanding US securities law and its extraterritorial application: the framework of US
regulations surrounding securities fraud; the availability of a private right of action in the United
States and how it compares with the regulatory regimes of other countries; and the presumption
against extraterritoriality in American law. Part II explains the conflicting tests that currently exist
in American jurisprudence regarding the extraterritorial reach of §10(b): the conduct-and-effects
test in Dodd-Frank and the bright-line transactional test articulated in Morrison. Finally, Part III
argues that the SEC study required by Dodd-Frank should conclude that the proposed test in Dodd-
Frank is inappropriate for determining the availability of §10(b) to a private class action involving
non-US parties and, instead, the transactional test articulated in Morrison should be upheld.
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INTRODUCTION
In July 2010, the US Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank") in
response to a need for financial regulatory reforms in the wake of
the 2008 global economic recession.' Dodd-Frank attempts to
introduce policies that better promote investor protection,
including strengthening the powers of the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") by extending the reach of the
SEC's enforcement powers beyond US territory.2
Just before Dodd-Frank was enacted, the US Supreme Court
decided Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd., an "f-cubed"
class action grounded upon § 10(b), the anti-fraud provision, of
* J.D. Candidate, May 2012, Fordham University School of Law; B.Com (Hons.),
2009, Sauder School of Business, University of British Columbia. The author would like
to thank Amy Abbandondclo and the editorial board of the Fordham International Law
journal for their valuable input; Professor Harold Moore, for whose class the author
wrote an earlier version of this Note; and most of all, the author's family and friends for
their support and encouragement. All errors are the author's own.
1. See Brady Dennis, Obama Ushers in New Financial Era, WASH. POST, July 22, 2010,
at A13 (reporting the signing of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act ("Dodd-Frank Act") into law); see also Damian Paletta & Aaron Lucchetti,
Law Remakes U.S. Financial Landscape, WALL ST.J., July 16, 2010, at AI-2 (reporting the
passing of the Dodd-Frank Act).
2. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act] (describing the purpose of
the Act "to promote the financial stability of the United States by improving
accountability and transparency in the financial system, ... to protect consumers from
abusive financial services practices . . . ."). The statute covers a wide range of issues, such
as executive compensation, whistleblower programs, and mortgage reform. See U.S. S.
COMM. ON BANKING, Hous., & URBAN AFFAIRS, Brief Summary of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2010), available at
http://banking.senate.gov/public/_Iiles/070 IIODodd_FrankWallStreet_Reform_
Comprehensive summaryFinal.pdf (summarizing the coverage of the Dodd-Frank Act);
see also A Closer Look: The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2 (Aug. 2010), http://www.pwc.com/us/en/financial-
services/regulatory-services/publications/assecs/closer-look-sec-enforcement-
examination.pdf (summarizing the issues addressed in the Dodd-Frank Act). The Dodd-
Frank Act also clarifies the jurisdiction of the US district courts for securities fraud
actions involving non-US parties. See Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(b). The Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") is the American government agency responsible for
enforcing US securities laws and regulating the securities industry. See The Investor's
Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates
Capital Formation, U.S. SEc. & EXCH. COMM'N, http://www.sec.gov/about/
whatwedo.shtml (last visited Apr. 8, 2011) [hereinafter About the SEC] (providing a
description of the goals and responsibilities of the SEC); see also Stephen J. Choi &
Andrew T. Guzman, The Dangerous Extraterritoriality of American Securities Law, 17 NW. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 207, 207 (1996) (describing the role of the SEC).
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the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act"). 3 An "f-
cubed," or "foreign-cubed," securities class action is a private
cause of action in which a non-US plaintiff sues a non-US issuer
in US federal court over transactions that occurred abroad.4 The
US Supreme Court dismissed the plaintiffs' claim in Morrison
because the securities involved were not purchased in the United
States.'
Morrison completely dismisses years of jurisprudence on the
extraterritorial reach of § 10(b) of the Exchange Act.6 Before
Morrison, extraterritoriality was determined on a case-by-case
basis, following the "conduct test," the "effects test," or a
combination of both.7 Dodd-Frank, however, effectively imposes
a "conduct-and-effect test" for cases involving non-US securities
brought by the SEC.8 Whether or not this test extends to private
rights of action is left unresolved, as Dodd-Frank only
commissions the SEC to conduct a study on whether the reach of
the conduct-and-effect test should be extended.9
Meanwhile, international capitals including London and
Paris are concerned that an SEC study regarding the extension of
§ 10(b) via the conduct-and-effect test could be the first step
toward the United States becoming a "global financial
policeman" through class action lawsuits brought in US courts. 0
3. See Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2875 (2010). The
relevant anti-fraud provision in Morrison is § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
4. Morrison v. Nat'1 Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 172 (2d Cir. 2008) (defining a
"foreign-cubed" transaction); see Derek N. White, Conduct and Effects: Reassessing the
Protection of Foreign Investors from International Securities Fraud, 22 REGENT U. L. REV. 81,
85 (2009) (presenting substantive and procedural issues raised by "foreign-cubed" class
actions).
5. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2888 ("This case involves no securities listed on a
domestic exchange, and ... the purchases complained of ... occurred outside the
United States. Petitioners have therefore failed to state a claim on which relief can be
granted.").
6. See infra Part I.B. for a fill discussion of Morrison.
7. See infra Part Il.A. for a discussion on the conduct test and the effects test.
8. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 9291, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
9. See Dodd-Frank Act § 929Y (requiring the SEC to conduct a study on whether
or not the conduct-and-effects test should be extended to private rights of action).
10. See Yves Mamou, Washington veut rdautoriser le retour des "class actions" itranglres
[Washington Wants to Reauthorize Foreign Class Actions], LE MONDE, July 21, 2010, at II
(reporting the passage of the Dodd-Frank Act in the United States along with reactions
from international capitals); see also George T. Conway III, Extraterritoriality after Dodd-
Frank, HARv. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Aug. 5, 2010, 8:58 AM),
http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2010/08/05/cxtraterritoriality-after-dodd-frank
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The securities class action is a key feature of US securities law."
Considering that the United States' position as a leader in the
financial market is precarious, in part due to a notoriously
capricious legal system, the US Congress and the SEC must
establish a framework that clearly delineates what is expected of
participants in the US securities market. 2 This is emphasized by
the rise of multiple listings, global securities offerings, and other
cross-border financing activity that could draw international
parties before US courts.' 3
This Note argues that the conduct-and-effects test set out in
Dodd-Frank should not extend to private rights of action under §
10(b) of the Exchange Act. Part I discusses three principle ideas
key to understanding US securities law and its extraterritorial
application: the framework of US regulations surrounding
securities fraud; the availability of a private right of action in the
United States and how it compares with the regulatory regimes of
other countries; and the presumption against extraterritoriality
in American law. Part II explains the conflicting tests that
currently exist in American jurisprudence regarding the
extraterritorial reach of § 10(b): the conduct-and-effects test in
Dodd-Frank and the bright-line transactional test articulated in
Morrison. Finally, Part III argues that the SEC study required by
Dodd-Frank should conclude that the proposed test in Dodd-
Frank is inappropriate for determining the availability of § 10(b)
to a private class action involving non-US parties and, instead, the
transactional test articulated in Morrison should be upheld.
(commenting upon the position of international governments on the extraterritoriality
provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act); Kellyc Y. Testy, Comity and Cooperation: Securities
Regulation in a Global Marketplace, 45 ALA. L. REV. 927, 957 (1994) (explaining that
extending US securities law would do little to improve the "already problematic image
of American pomposity").
II. See infra Part l.B. for a discussion of securities class actions.
12. See infra Part l.A., I.B.I., and 1.1.2. for a discussion of the American legal
framework with respect to securities litigation.
13. See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Multinational Class Actions under Federal Securities
Law: Managing jurisdictional Conflict, 46 COILUM. j. TRANSNAT'L. L. 14, 16--17 (2007)
(arguing that in an increasingly internationalized securities market, there is bound to he
conflict between class actions litigated under American securities law and international
jurisdictions); see also White, supra note 4, at 85 (recognizing the rise of international
transactions, particularly foreign cubed transactions). In September 2010 alone, US
residents purchased a net US$10.4 billion of long-term non-US securities. See Treasury
International Capital Data for September (Nov. 16, 2010), U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/TG952.aspx.
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I. GLOBAL SECURITIES LITIGATION
Jurisdictions regulate their securities industries in whatever
manner they find appropriate and accordingly, each jurisdiction
has its own particular approach to enforcing its regulations.
American securities regulation, and the enforcement thereof via
private litigation, has been the subject of much commentary.
Commentary extolling its strengths and denouncing its
weaknesses informs the conflict between Dodd-Frank and
Morrison. This Part provides an overview of concepts
underpinning the conflict between Dodd-Frank and Morrison
regarding the appropriate test to determine extraterritoriality in
private rights of action. First, Section A provides a synopsis of US
securities law, specifically its anti-fraud mechanisms. Next,
Section B discusses the private right of action implied under §
10(b) and its use in the United States, as compared to regulatory
schemes available elsewhere. Last, Section C provides an overview
of the longstanding presumption against extraterritoriality in
American law.
A. Framework of US Securities Laws
The United States has a fairly robust system of financial
regulations.14 Players in the financial market have to abide by,
among others, the Securities Act of 1933, the Exchange Act, the
Investment Advisor Act of 1940, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
and now, Dodd-Frank.' 5 Collectively, these rules exist under the
auspices of the SEC to maintain market integrity by protecting
14. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 2, at 207 (recognizing the complexity and
intricacy of the US securities regulatory regime); see also About the SEC, supra note 2
(providing an overview of the regulations governing the US securities industry).
15. See Securities Lawyer's Deskbook, U. CIN. C. L., http://taft.law.uc.edu/CCL/xyz/
sldtoc.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2011) (providing the text of statutes and regulations that
govern the US securities market). See generally About the SEC, supra note 2 (listing the
statutes that govern securities in the United States).
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investors from fraud.16 The SEC engages in efforts to promote
truth, honesty, and fair dealing. 7
The Securities Act of 1933 requires issuers to register their
securities, subject to certain exceptions, with the SEC.i8
Meanwhile, the Exchange Act created the SEC and gave it
disciplinary powers.19 The Exchange Act regulates secondary
trading involving stock exchanges. 20 Section 10(b) of the
Exchange Act makes it unlawful for "manipulative or deceptive
device[s] or contrivance [s]" to be used in connection with "the
purchase or sale of any security" listed on a national securities
exchange. 2'
The SEC promulgated Rule 10b-5 under its authority to
prescribe rules and regulations as necessary.22 Together, § 10(b)
16. See About the SEC, supra note 2 ("[T]he SEC is concerned primarily with ...
maintaining fair dealing, and protecting against fraud."); Richard C. Breeden, Foreign
Companies and U.S. Securities Markets in a Time of Economic Transformation, 17 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. S77, S82 (1994) ("[W]c have managed to build arduously a system ... of
extraordinary confidence in the fundamental integrity of the U.S. market.").
17. See About the SEC, supra note 2; see also Breeden, supra note 16, at S81 ("[T]he
most important factor of all is strong public confidence in the honesty and integrity of
the U.S. market.").
18. See Securities Exchange Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2006) (requiring the
registration of securities in the United States).
19. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2006) (creating the SEC and defining its role in the US
federal government); see also About the SEC, supra note 2 (describing the SEC's
enforcement powers).
20. See 15 U.S.C. § 78b (2006) (explaining that the effect of transactions that
occur over securities exchanges on the public necessitate regulation). American
securities exchanges, such as the New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE") and the National
Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations ("NASDAQ"), are subject to the
Exchange Act; see, e.g., U.S. Securities Regulation and NYSE Rules, NYSE.COM,
http://www.nys.com/regulation/nyse/1045516499685.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2011)
(explaining how the NYSE is governed by federal securities laws); Bulletin: Impact of
NASDAQ Exchange Registration on Listed Companies, NASDAQ 1 (2006),
http://www.nasdaq.com/about/ExchangeBulletin_051506.pdf (announcing that the
SEC has approved NASDAQ as a national securities exchange and explaining the
implications of that approval under the Exchange Act).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (2006). Section 10(b) forbids:
any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means . . . [t]o use or employ, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national
securities exchange[,] . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
22. See id. (stating that the SEC may prescribe rules and regulations "as
necessary"); see also United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651 (1997) ("The [SEC]
adopted Rule l0l.5 pursuant to its § 10(b) rulcmaking authority. . . .").
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and Rule 10b-5 prohibit manipulation or deception in the
exchange of any security.23 Disgorgements of profits and criminal
penalties collected by the SEC are generally distributed to
injured investors.24
Dodd-Frank adds an extraterritoriality provision to § 10(b).2
Before Dodd-Frank, whether or not § 10(b) applied to non-US
issuers, or whether it governed transactions that took place
abroad, was unclear.26 Nevertheless, US federal courts had
previously extended § 10(b) both in cases where the SEC sought
to enforce the anti-fraud provision, and where private individuals
sought to recover damages from issuers in contravention of the
statute.27 Prior to Dodd-Frank and Morrison, if the fraudulent
conduct had taken place in the United States ("conduct test"), or
some effect of fraudulent conduct reached the United States
("effect test"), then the alleged non-US fraudulent issuer could
be sued in US district court under § 10(b).28 These tests applied
to both private plaintiffs and the SEC.29
23. See 17C.F.R. § 240.10b-5(b) (2010). Rule IOb-5 makes it unlawful for:
any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securities
exchange, (a) [t]o employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) [t]o make
any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in
order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which
they were made, not misleading, or (c) [tlo engage in any act, practice, or course of
business which operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
Id.
24. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientitic-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 166 (2008)
(stating that the SEC's enforcement powers are effective, with over US$10 billion
collected in disgorgement and penalties since 2002, and benefit injured investors); see
also Putting Investors First: 2009 Performance and Accountability Report, SEC, 129,
http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar2009.pdf (last visited Apr. 8, 2011) (stating
that the SEC returns linds collected from enforcement actions to harmed investors).
25. See Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 929Y, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010)
(adding a provision to the Exchange Act pertaining to its extraterritorial reach).
26. See Buxhaum, supra note 13, at 17 (stating that the multinational securities
class action raises "especially thorny jurisdictional questions"); see also Choi & Guzman,
supra note 2, at 215 (describing the various provisions that do and do not extend
jurisdiction).
27. See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Berger, 322 F.Sd 187, 193 (2d Cir. 2003)
(applying both the conduct test and effect test in an SEC action), abrogated by Morrison
v. Nat'l AustlI. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010); infra Part II.A. for examples of private
causes of action decided under the conduct test and the effects test.
28. See Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968), (introducing
the effects test) abrogated by Morrison v. Nat'1 Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010);
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Dodd-Frank now clarifies the jurisdiction of the US federal
courts with regard to the SEC's power to enforce § 10(b) against
non-US issuers participating in international stock exchanges:
The district courts of the United States . . . shall have jurisdiction
of an action or proceeding brought or instituted by the
Commission or the United States . .. involving (1) conduct within
the United States that constitutes significant steps in furtherance
of the violation, even if the securities transaction occurs outside
the United States and involves only foreign investors; or (2)
conduct occurring outside the United States that has a foreseeable
substantial effect within the United States.3 0
Dodd-Frank, however, does not merely reinstate a
repackaged version of the pre-Morrison conduct test or the effects
test.3 ' Dodd-Frank only compels the SEC to conduct a study on
whether this test should be extended to private rights of action,
which may potentially supersede Morrison.12 Dodd-Frank does not
explicitly supersede Morrison.33 Congressional records, however,
show that leading advocates of the investor protection sections of
Dodd-Frank intended to rebut the presumption against
extraterritoriality that Morrison upholds34 The Dodd-Frank Act
only clearly rebuts that presumption for cases brought forward by
the US government.35
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972),
(introducing the conduct test) abrogated by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869.
29. See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 193 (2d Cir. 2003)
(applying both the conduct test and effects test in an SEC action), abrogated by Morrison
v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. CL. 2869 (2010); infra Part II.A. for examples of private
causes of action decided under the conduct test and the eflects test.
30. Dodd-Frank Act § 9291P.
31. See id. (specifying that the conduct-and-effects test applies to actions instituted
by the SEC).
32. See id. § 929Y.
33. See Conway, supra note 10 (stating that "neither provision [of Dodd-Frank]
overturns [Morrison]"). See generally Dodd-Frank Act § 929Y (providing only that the SEC
conduct a study on the scope, implications, and costs of the conduct-and-effects test).
34. See 156 CONG. REC. H5237 (daily ed. June 30, 2010) (statement of Rep.
Kanjorski) (stating that the purpose of Dodd-Frank Act § 929P1 is to rebut the
presumption against extraterritoriality espoused in Morrison). Rep. Paul Kanjorski of
Pennsylvania was among the group of lawmakers that spearheaded the investor
protection sections of the Dodd-Frank bill, and drafted Section 9291' of the Dodd-Frank
Act. Id. at H5235-5237.
35. Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(b).
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Section 929(Y) of Dodd-Frank lists the following factors for
the SEC to consider in conducting its study on the extension of
the conduct-and-effect test to private rights of action:
(1) the scope of such a private right of action, including whether it
should extend to all private actors or whether it should be more
limited to extend just to institutional investors or otherwise; (2)
what implications such a private right of action would have on
international comity; (3) the economic costs and benefits of
extending a private right of action for transnational securities
frauds; and (4) whether a narrower extraterritorial standard should
be adopted.36
The SEC has since issued a request for comments on this
issue.37 Until this study is completed, a private party cannot sue a
non-US issuer in US district court for transactions that did not
take place in the United States.38
B. Securities Class Actions
This Section discusses the private right of action available
under American law, and how it is susceptible to abuse, thereby
affecting the United States' market power. This Section also
presents other jurisdictions' approaches to civil litigation and
securities regulation by way of comparison.
1. The Private Right of Action under US Law
The US Congress has never expressly authorized private
rights of action under § 10(b), but courts have found a private
right of action implied in the words of the statute.39 In a private
action, the plaintiff must prove "(1) a material misrepresentation
36. Dodd-Frank Act § 929Y(b).
37. See Study on Extraterritorial Private Rights of Action, Exchange Act Release
No. 34-63174, 75 Fed. Reg. 66,822, 66,822 (Oct. 29, 2010), available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/other/2010/34-63174.pdf (soliciting public comment
pertaining to this issue).
38. See id. at 66, 822-23; see also Morrison v. Nat'l Austi. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869,
2888 (2010) (imposing a transactional test to determine whether or not § 10(b)
applies).
39. See Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 157 (2008)
("Though the text of the Securities Exchange Act does not provide for a private cause of
action for § 10(b) violations, the Court has found a right of action implied in the words
of the statute . . . ."); see also Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S.
6, 13 n.9 (1971) (recognizing the private right of action implied under § 10(b)).
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or omission by the defendant; (2) scienter; (3) a connection
between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or
sale of a security; (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or
omission; (5) economic loss; and (6) loss causation." 40 Unlike
private litigants, such as individual investors, the SEC does not
have to show reliance, economic loss, or causation.41 The SEC
also has the authority to pursue cases of attempted fraud.42
The US Supreme Court has previously been sensitive to the
expansion of the private right of action because it is a judicial
construct.43 This is true despite Congress' acceptance of the §
10(b) private right illustrated by the enactment of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 ("PSLRA"), the
procedural framework governing securities class actions." The
PSLRA imposes additional requirements beyond the structure
established by Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.45
Congress was concerned that the class action mechanism actually
benefited plaintiffs' attorneys more than the plaintiffs
themselves.46 The PSLRA thus sought to introduce substantive
changes in securities litigation in an effort to curb abusive
litigation with frivolous claims designed to extort settlements
from companies.47 The threat of costly and disruptive discovery
40. See Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 157.
41. See Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Blavin, 760 F.2d 706, 711 (6th Cir. 1985) (stating
that the SEC need not prove reliance, causation, or pecuniary loss); see also Sec. & Exch.
Comm'n v. Adoni, 60 F. Supp. 2d 401, 405 (D.N.J. 1999) (citing Blavin, 760 F.2d at 711).
42. See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm'n v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1977)
(finding that the text of § 10(b) does not require the successful accomplishment of a
fraudulent scheme as a precondition to liability); Kuchnert v. Texstar Corp., 412 F.2d
700, 704 (5th Cir. 1969) ("[W]e are not convinced of any difference ... between a
successful fraud and an attempt.").
43. See Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 164 (acknowledging that the Supreme Court has
approached the § 10(b) private right with caution as it is not provided in the statute).
44. See id. at 166 ("It is appropriate for us to assume that when [the PSLRA] was
enacted, Congress accepted the § 10(b) private cause of action . . . .").
45. See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a) (2006) (providing additional requirements for
plaintiffs to observe). Rule 23 requires commonality, typicality, numeracy, and adequacy
in the class. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
46. See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 32 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730,
731 (stating that the PSLRA would "protect[] investors who join class actions against
lawyer-driven lawsuits . . . ."); see also Buxbaum, supra note 13, at 26 (noting claims that
class actions were enriching plaintiffs attorneys).
47. See Buxhaum, supra note 13, at 26 n.42. Such changes included heightened
pleading requirements, safe harbors for forward looking statements, and eliminated
some derivative liability for securities violations. See id. at 26-27. See generally 15 U.S.C. §
7 8u-4 (2006).
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alone can increase the settlement value of even meritless claims.48
Although it has long been argued that the class action
mechanism is useful in holding companies accountable, a recent
study suggests that securities class-action suits do not bolster
share value, and may drive down share price even further.49
2. The Effects of Abusive Litigation on US Market Power
Abusive class action suits have been deemed detrimental to
the United States' position as a leader in the global financial
market.50 Thus, there are additional policy considerations that
shape the debate on extraterritoriality, related to the United
States' economic well-being.51 The United States' complicated
approach to securities litigation imposes economic risks upon
potential issuers.52 Every facet of a regulatory or legislative
framework introduces additional considerations that issuers have
to take into account in deciding whether or not to cross-list their
securities in American stock exchanges.53 This, in turn, affects
48. See, e.g., Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 163 ("[E]xtensive discovery and the potential
for uncertainty and disruption in a lawsuit allow plaintiffs with weak claims to extort
settlements from innocent companies."); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421
U.S. 723, 740 (1975) (stating that there are complaints that have settlement value to
plaintiffs despite being objectively difficult to win at trial).
49. See Rob Bauer & Robin Braun, Misdeeds Matter: Long-Term Stock Price
Performance after the Filing of Class-Action Lawsuits, 66 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 74, 91 (2010)
(presenting findings from statistical analyses suggesting that shareholder litigation is
disruptive to business operations). See generally William W. Bratton & Michael L.
Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 653 (2010)
(discussing the role of shareholders in corporate risk management).
50. Michael R. Bloomberg & Charles E. Schumer, Sustaining New York's and the US'
Global Financial Services Leadership, NYC.gov, at ii, http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdf/
ny-report final.pdf (last visited July 17, 2011) [hereinafter New York Report] (reporting
on the state of the US financial market and presenting factors that affect the United
States' role in the global financial market).
51. See id. at 73 (stating that the extraterritorial reach of US securities law is a
concern when evaluating the US legal system); see also Buxbaum, supra note 13, at 63
(stating that those concerned with the competitiveness of US financial markets consider
the application of US securities law to non-US claimants to be a drawback).
52. See New York Report, supra note 50, at 75 (recognizing that corporate
executives are concerned about the "high legal cost of doing business in the US
financial [market]"); see also Buxhaum, supra note 13, at 63 ("[I]n the securities field in
particular, an expansive approach to multinational litigation presents a specific
economic risk.").
53. See New York Report, supra note 50, at 78 ("Striking the right regulatory
balance is crucial for any financial center . . . ."); see also Buxhaum, supra note 13, at 63
(stating that ajurisdiction's approach to litigation is relevant to a company's decision on
where to list their shares).
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the performance of the US financial markets, and the ability of
American investors to diversify their portfolios. 5 4
It has been suggested that London has taken over New
York's role as the world's leading financial center, followed by
Sydney.55 New York, the United States' financial center, has
attributed its decline in global financial leadership to the United
States' complicated financial regulatory framework and a legal
environment that does not adequately deter frivolous litigation.56
The US legal environment is already seen as expensive and
unpredictable, comprised of litigious participants forcing the
securities industry to bear a significant chunk of associated
costs.5 7 These concerns might be quite significant to non-US
issuers, and could interfere with the competitiveness of US
financial markets. 5 8 Making the private right of action under §
10(b) available to investors involved in predominantly
international transactions, such as "f-cubed" transactions, would
be the type of legal cost that a non-US issuer might find too
great, to the detriment of the US markets. 59
54. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 2, at 224-25 (arguing that extending the reach
of American securities law beyond the United States hinders American capital markets);
see also Buxbaum, supra note 13, at 69 (suggesting that US investors may benefit from
having a wide variety of investments to choose from in building their portfolios).
55. See Hugo Duncan, Worries Lurk as London Takes World Number One Finance Spot,
LONDON EVENING STANDAR, Sept. 10, 2009, htip://www.thisislondon.co.uk/standard-
business/article-23754577-worries-lurk-as-london-takes-world-number-one-finance-
spot.do (stating that London and Sydney have surpassed New York in leading the global
financial industry); see also Joshua Zumbrun, World's Most Economically Powerful Cities,
FORBES, July 15, 2008, http://www.forbes.com/2008/07/15/economic-growth-gdp-biz-
cx-jz_0715powercities.html (reporting its findings that London, not New York, is the
world's most economically powerful city).
56. See New York Report, supra note 50, at i-ii (stating that New York, and the US,
must take proactive steps to compete with other jurisdictions, which have more
organized regulatory principles).
57. See New York Report, supra note 50, at 74 ("The propensity toward litigation
... is of particular importance to the securities industry, which in recent years has borne
a disproportionate share of the overall cost."). Meanwhile, Member States of the
European Union have expressed their commitment to consistent applications of the law
while reducing the burden of regulatory costs to the securities industry. Jochen Sanio,
President, Fed. Fin. Supervisory Auth. of Ger., Opening Remarks at the European
Financial Forum: The EU's Changing Capital Market (Dec. 1, 2007).
58. See New York Report, supra note 50, at 73 (explaining that the increasingly
broad reach of US securities laws hampers the competitiveness of US markets); see also
Buxhaum, supra note 13, at 63 (stating that a jurisdiction's approach to litigation is
relevant to a company's decision on where to list their shares).
59. Brief of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondents at 25-26, Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct.
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3. Differing Views on Civil Litigation
The US civil litigation system has been considered
"anticompetitive and too entrepreneurial. "60 International
comity is a significant issue underlying the question of
extraterritoriality. 6' Jurisdictions across the globe differ from the
United States in a number of ways that would affect a party's
substantive and procedural rights. For example, the British legal
system requires the losing party to pay for the winning party's
legal fees, and awards only compensatory damages.62 The US
legal system places no such additional burden upon the losing
party, permits punitive damages, and allows attorneys to be paid
on a contingency basis.63 Moreover, private rights of action
grounded in British securities law do not typically involve a jury
trial. 6 4 Thus, the United States is an attractive forum for investors,
given its active plaintiff's bar, the economies of scale achieved in
litigating smaller claims en masse via class actions, and, specific to
2869 (2010) (No. 08-1191) [hereinafter UK Amicus Briel] ("Extraterritorial extension
of the [§ 10(b)] private right ... substantially raises the risk of exposing foreign issuers
to unforeseen class actions, thereby discouraging foreign investment in United States
businesses . . . ."); see also Stoneridge Inv. Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S.
148, 164 (2008) (recognizing the need to consider the interests of firms based elsewhere
when expanding the scope of US securities laws); New York Report, supra note 50, at 77
(stating that the complicated US legal structure, which includes class actions,
complicates risk management in the United States).
60. Mark A. Behrens et. al., Global Litigation Trends, 17 MICH. ST. J. INT'l L. 165,
166 (2009); see also Buxhaum, supra note 13, at 63 (stating that the US style of lawyering
is entrepreneurial).
61. See Dodd-Frank Act § 929Y (listing international comity as a factor for the
SEC's consideration in extending the conduct and effects test to private securities class
actions).
62. See UK Amicus Brief, supra note 58, at 10-11. The "loser pays" rule is the
predominant rule outside the United States, particularly in Europe. Behrens, supra note
60, at 183.
63. See Richard L. Markus, Putting American Procedural Exceptionalism into a
Globalized Context, 53 AM.J. COMP. L. 709, 709-10 (2005) (giving examples of procedural
characteristics unique to American litigation); see also UK Amicus Brief, supra note 59 at
10-11 (emphasizing differences between the American and British civil litigation
systems).
64. See UK Amicus Brief, supra note 59, at II ("Trial by jury is rare in U.K. private
securities fraud litigation."). UK courts can refuse a jury trial where a prolonged
examination of documents or accounts cannot be conveniently made with a jury
present. See Markus, supra note 63, at 713.
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securities litigation, that the reliance element is presumed in a §
10(b) class action.65
As a result of the increasingly global nature of commerce,
and changing attitudes in favor of protecting consumer interests,
there has been widespread reform in the area of aggregative
litigation.66 Most of Europe and South America have been
moving toward recognizing actions with multiple plaintiffs. 67
Examples include class actions, group actions, and representative
actions by consumer or public organizations.68 While this trend is
growing, opt-out procedures, contingency fees, and punitive
damages remain generally prohibited.69 Certain countries have
also specifically declined to extend multi-claimant litigation in
the realm of securities fraud.70
4. Comparative Securities Regulations
There are also substantive differences among various
countries' securities regulations. For instance, nations disagree
65. See Nathan Koppel & Ashby Jones, Securities Ruling Limits Claims of Fraud,
WALL ST.J., Sept. 28, 2010 at Cl (stating that the US courts have a reputation of being
plaintiff-friendly); see also Buxhaum, supra note 13, at 61-64 (describing conflicts
between the United States' approach to class action litigation and those of other
jurisdictions); White, supra note 4, at 102-03 (stating that US courts are an attractive
forum for plaintiffs because litigation is more accessible, and that the burden of proving
individual reliance in other jurisdictions remains with the plaintill).
66. See Behrens et. al., supra note 60, at 167-68 (explaining that there has been
growth in the area of aggregative litigation in other countries for a number of reasons,
including the globalization of commerce and a policy shift towards consumer
protection); see also White, supra note 4, at 104-05 (stating that class actions have been
introduced in a number of other jurisdictions) .
67. See Behrens et. al., supra note 60, at 167-68 (explaining that "[miany
countries, including most European and several South American nations, now recognize
some form of multiclaimant litigation"); see also White, supra note 4, at 104 (listing
countries that have begun to form class action mechanisms).
68. See Behrens et. al., supra note 60, at 193 (providing examples of developing
multi-claimant litigation); see also Deborah R. Hensler, The Globalization of Class Actions:
An Overview, 622 ANNALS AM. AcAD. Poi. & Soc. SCI. 7, 13 (2009) (stating that
aggregative procedures available elsewhere may come with limitations, while some are as
broad as US class actions).
69. See Behrens, supra note 60, at 193; see also Buxhaum, supra note 13, at 63
(stating that aspects of the US civil litigation system, such as contingency fees and opt-
out procedures, are not allowed in otherjurisdictions).
70. Brief of the International Chamber of Commerce et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 24, Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010)
(No. 08-1191) [hereinafter European Associations Amicus Briell; see Samuel P.
Baumgartner, Class Actions and Group Litigation in Switzerland, 27 Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus.
301, 345-46 n.316 (2007).
1558 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 34:1544
on what constitutes actionable securities fraud.7' Elements of a
securities fraud claim may also be defined differently.72 Finally,
certain jurisdictions prefer to approach securities fraud publicly,
via law enforcement, rather than via private litigation.73 This is a
result of the dichotomy between civil law and common law
systems: civil law systems prefer the primacy of legislation over
judge-made law.74
These divergent views raise questions of duplicate recovery
and forum shopping across jurisdictions.75 In jurisdictions where
a US judgment is not recognized, the issuer may have to defend
itself more than once if the plaintiff is permitted to sue in more
than one forum.76 Conversely, an international plaintiff may be
forcibly included in a lawsuit that he does not want to be part of,
and later be precluded from bringing a claim on his own.7 7
71. See Testy, supra note 10, at 957 (stating that nations have different views on
securities fraud and securities regulation, with only classic cases of deceit and
manipulation as possible instances of fraud that would be actionable in all jurisdictions);
see also, Steven R. Salbu, Regulation of Insider Trading in a Global Marketplace: A Uniform
Statutory Approach, 66 TUL. L. REV. 837, 837-39 (1992) (noting differences in insider
trading laws among the United States, the European Economic Community, and Japan).
72. See, e.g., Buxhaum, supra note 13, at 61 ("[T]he United States is unusual in
recognizing presumed reliance . . . ."); UK Amicus Brief, supra note 59, at 16 (raising the
definition of materiality, as in material disclosures, as an example where policy-makers
can diler); European Associations Amicus Brief, supra note 69, at 24 (citing examples of
how Swiss law differs from American law, including divergent definitions of "material"
facts, and the absence of a rebuttable presumption of causation).
73. See Buxbaum, supra note 13, at 61 (stating that there are countries that would
rather have public proceedings than private litigation to enforce their laws); see also
White, supra note 4, at 105 (stating that civil law countries prefer legislation rather than
litigation when it comes to law enforcement).
74. See Buxbaum, supra note 13, at 61 (stating that there are countries that would
rather have public proceedings than private litigation to enforce their laws); see also
White, supra note 4, at 105 (stating that civil law countries prefer legislation rather than
litigation when it comes to law enforcement).
75. See Daniel S. Kahn, The Collapsing Jurisdictional Boundaries of the Antifraud
Provisions of the U.S. Securities Laws: The Supreme Court and Congress Ready to Redress Forty
Years of Ambiguity, 6 N.Y.U. J. L. & BUS. 365, 413 (2010) (raising concerns of multiple
recoveries against the same defendant in different jurisdictions); see also Buxbaum, supra
note 13, at 60-61 (recognizing that conflicting approaches to class actions issues relating
to duplicate recovery and forum-shopping).
76. See Kahn, supra note 74, at 413 (raising concerns of multiple recoveries
against the same defendant in different jurisdictions); see also Buxbaum supra note 13, at
60-61 (recognizing that conflicting approaches to class actions issues relating to
duplicate recovery and forum-shopping).
77. See Kahn, supra note 74, at 413 (raising concerns of multiple recoveries
against the same defendant in different jurisdictions); see also Buxhaum supra note 13, at
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It has been suggested that to remain competitive, the United
States' financial regulatory regime ought to be more cohesive
and predictable.78 The US system need not be perfect, but it
should balance domestic policy concerns against some sense of
integration with international regulatory schemes.79 Until
globally applicable regulations are in place, the United States
must be able to coordinate with other jurisdictions and trust in
the regulatory choices made elsewhere.80
There do not appear to be gaps in international
enforcement should the United States decline to extend § 10(b)
beyond its borders.8' In addition to the United Kingdom,
Switzerland and Germany have also enacted robust and
sophisticated prohibitions against securities fraud, and have been
committed to enforcing their laws.82 The European Union has
also issued directives pertaining to securities regulation, while
still leaving room for individual Member States to devise their
60-61 (recognizing that conflicting approaches to class actions issues relating to
duplicate recovery and forum-shopping).
78. See New York Report, supra note 50, at 78 ("[T]he [US] system's complexity,
cost, and perceived lack of responsiveness, if left unchanged, are likely to make the
United States less attractive going fonvard."); see also Choi & Guzman, supra note 2, at
208 (stating that "American capital markets are served best through clear jurisdictional
rules that . . . provide unambiguous means for [parties] to opt-out of the domestic
regulatory system").
79. See Kahn, supra note 75, at 418 (discussing the need for American securities
regulations to take a balanced approach to enforcement and allow for international
cooperation); see also Buxbaum, supra note 13, at 64 (cautioning against extending the
reach of US securities law in the absence of the full participation of otherjurisdictions).
80. See Kahn, supra note 74, at 418; see also European Associations Amictis Brief,
supra note 71, at 21 ("[B]ecause clarity and cooperation are the lifeblood of deterrence,
muddying the waters through extraterritorial application of U.S. law will further hinder
the common objective of preventing securities fraud.").
81. See European Associations Amicus Brief, supra note 71, at 17 (arguing that the
Morrison case could have been brought in Australia, tinder Australian law); see also Kahn,
supra note 75, at 409 ("[A] federal court in the United States certainly would not be the
only arbiter with jurisdiction over claims arising out of that transaction, and may not be
the most appropriate one either.").
82. See, e.g., Wertpapierhandelsgcsetz. [WpHG] [Securities Trading Act], Sept. 9,
1998, BGBL. I at 1592 (Ger.); LOI SUR LA SURVEILLANCE DES MARCHES FINANCIERS
[LFINMA] [FINANCIAL MARKET SUPERVISION Acr] Jan. 1, 2009, SR 956.1, art. 5 (Switz.);
Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8, § 90 (U.K.); see also European Associations
Amicus Brief, supra note 72, at 21-26 (explaining the Swiss and German regulatory
regimes); UK Amicus Brief, supra note 59, at 5-8 (explaining the securities regulations
of the United Kingdom).
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own policies.83 Moreover, any additional risks imposed by
differing regulations inform the prices of securities traded in
those markets.8
Switzerland enacted the Swiss Financial Market Supervision
Act, unifying the several laws governing their financial market,
and created a new regulatory agency to oversee investor
protection mechanisms. 5 Swiss laws impose an ongoing duty for
issuers to disclose potentially price-sensitive facts as they arise,
and hold officers and directors criminally responsible for false or
incomplete disclosures.8 6 Should misrepresentations be made in
connection with an initial public offering, the plaintiff only needs
to prove that the defendant was negligent. 7 Private civil claims
83. See Brief of European Aeronautic Defence & Space Co. N.V. ct al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Respondents, at 16-17, Morrison v. Nat'1 Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct.
2869 (2010) (No. 08-1191) [hereinafter European Companies Amicus Brief]
(explaining the European Union's approach to securities regulation via the issuance of
directives attempting to create uniform securities law) The European Union has sought
to establish integrated European capital markets and has been issuing directives since
2003 that affect securities regulation within the European Union. Examples include a
unilied process for public offerings, minimum reporting standards, and regulations
pertaining to issuers' disclosure of material information. E.g., Directive 2004/109/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council on the Harmonisation of' Transparency
Requirements in Relation to Information about Issuers Whose Securities are Admitted
to Trading on a Regulated Market, 2004 0'. L 390/38; Directive 2003/71/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council on the Prospectus to be Published when
Securities are Offered to the Public or Admitted to Trading, 2003 OJ. L 345/64;
Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on Insider Dealing
and Market Manipulation (Market Abuse), 2003 O.J. L 96/16..
84. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 2, at 220-21 (stating that the regulatory
structure in place would affect how investors price securities); see also Buxhaum, supra
note 13, at 68 (stating that the price of a security would reflect the regulatory scheme
governing that security).
85. SEE LOI SUR LA SURVEILIANCE DES MARCHES FINANCIERS [LFINMA] [FINANCIAL
MARKET SUPERVISION ACT] jan. 1, 2009, SR 956.1, art. I (Switz.); see also Thouvenin
Rechtsanwalte, Switzerland: Financial Market Supervision Act, INT'L FIN. L. REv. (May
2009), http://www.il1r.com/Article/2190402/Financial-Markct-Supervision-Act.html.
86. CODE PENAL SUISSE [CP] [Swiss CRIMINAL CODE], Dec. 21, 1937, RS 311,
art.152 (imposing criminal liability upon directors and oflicers for misleading
information); SIX Swiss Exchange Listing Rules, SIX Exchange Regulation, Art. 53, http://
www.six-exchange-regulation.com/admissionmanual/03-01-LR-en.pdf (last visited July
20, 2011) (requiring the disclosure of price-sensitive information).
87. See CODE DES OBLIGATIONS [CO] [CODE OF OBLIGATIONS], Mar. 30, 1911, SR
220, art. 752 (Switz.) (establishing negligence as the minimum standard of culpability
for misleading information in a prospectus).
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for damages resulting from misrepresentation are also
permitted.88
Germany has also enacted its own comprehensive
legislation, the Securities Trading Act. 9 This legislation covers
insider trading, market manipulation, and the dissemination of
false information affecting the value of securities.90 Germany,
although cooperative with the SEC in the past, has also previously
expressed its objection to US civil suits that encroach on its
"sovereign prerogative" to respond to securities fraud occurring
within its borders.9' Germany expressly grants exclusive venue to
the issuer's home state in securities fraud cases, therefore
blocking the enforcement of judgments or settlements
adjudicated in America against German issuers.92
Commentators have suggested that if the United States does
not tread carefully, other nations will engage in policies similar to
Germany's, undermining efforts to create a stable international
securities market.93 Governments and economic agencies alike
have overwhelmingly voiced their concerns about
extraterritoriality, as evidenced by the number of amicus briefs
88. See id. art. 41, § 2 (permitting compensatory payments in private actions for
damages).
89. See generally Wertpapierhandelsgesetz [WpHG] [Securities Trading Act], Sept.
9, 1998, BGBI. I at 1592 (Ger.).
90. See id. §§ 14, 20a, 37b, 37c.
91. See Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 996-97 (2d Cir. 1975),
(stating that the record contains affidavits from the German government explaining
their refusal to honor any judgments made against the defendant issuer as a bar for their
citizens' own claims for securities fraud; the English, French, Italian, and Swiss
governments submitted similar allidavits) abrogated by Morrison v. Nat'I Austl. Bank Ltd.,
130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010); see also European Associations Amicus Brief, supra note 72, at 26.
The SEC has bilateral memoranda of understanding on information sharing and
enforcement cooperation with its counterpart agencies in more than twenty different
countries. See Brief' of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 26,
n.4, Morrison', 130 S. Ct. 2869 (No. 08-1191) [hereinafter SEC Amicus Brief].
92. See ZIVILPROZEsSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], Sept. 12, 1950,
BUNDESGESETZIATr [BGL. I] 81781, as amended, § 32b (Ger.) (restricting venue to
the home state of the issuer in a securities fraud action); see also European Associations
Amicus Brief, supra note 72, at 26 (commenting upon Germany's restrictions on venue
for securities cases).
93. See Sharon E. Foster, While America Slept: The Harmonization of Competition Laws
Based Upon the European Union Model, 15 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 467, 486 (2001) (arguing,
in the context of antitrust law, that unilaterally extending the extraterritorial reach of
US law could lead to increased resistance elsewhere); see also White, supra note 4, at 115-
16 (suggesting that non-US courts may retaliate by extending jurisdiction over
predominantly American cases).
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filed when Morrison was argued in the Supreme Court.94 Morrison
is also not the first US securities class action case to hear
objections from other countries.95
C. The Presumption against Extraterritoriality in American Law
"United States law governs domestically but does not rule
the world."96 Congress may choose to enforce its laws beyond the
territorial boundaries of the United States should it so intend;
however, it has long been recognized that absent Congress'
express intent as shown in the face of the statute, federal law has
no extraterritorial reach.97 Since 1804, US courts have recognized
that, where possible, a statue should be construed as not to
violate international law.98 This principle is all the more relevant
in today's "highly interdependent commercial world."99
Moreover, the US Supreme Court has been careful in choosing
to step away from "sensitive questions of international
relations."o10  Such issues are deemed to be best left to political
94. See, e.g., UK Amicus Brief, supra note 59; European Associations Amicus Brief,
supra note 72; European Companies Amicus Brief, supra note 83; see also U.S. Supreme
Court Greatly Restricts Extraterritorial Application of Civil Securities Fraud Actions
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP (July 19, 2010),
http://www.skadden.com/content/Publications/Publications21 120.pdf [hereinafter
Skadden Memo] (recognizing the implications of amicus briefs filed by Australia,
France, and the United Kingdom).
95. See Bersch, 519 F.2d at 996-97 (stating that England, Germany, Italy, and
Switzerland filed affidavits to the court hearing a § 10(b) claim).
96. Microsoft Co. v. AT&T Co., 550 U.S. 437, 454-55 (2007) (discussing the
extraterritorial reach of US patent law).
97. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. ("Aramco"), 499
U.S. 244, 248 (1991) ("It is a longstanding principle of American law 'that legislation of
Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States."' (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285
(1949))).
98. Murray v. Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) ("It has also been
observed that an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of
nations if any other possible construction remains . . . .").
99. F. Holfman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A. ("Empagran"), 542 U.S. 155, 165
(2004) (ruling on the extraterritorial reach of US antitrust law); see also Susan E.
Burnett, U.S. Judicial Imperialism Post Empagran v. F. Hoffman-LaRoche? Conflicts of
Jurisdiction and International Comity in Extraterritorial Antitrust, 18 EMORY INT'L L. REV.
555, 633 (2004) (recognizing, in the context of antitrust regulation, that there is a
demand for cooperation across international agencies due to the increasingly
interdependent nature of markets).
100. John H. Knox, A Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 Am. J. Int'l
L. 351, 386 (2010) (citing cases where the US Supreme Court urged caution in
potentially interfering with international policy decisions that should be left to
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branches, which are probably better versed in the realm of
international relations and policy.'0 This stance also has some
pecuniary benefits, considering US courts have limited
resources. 02 The idea is that American courts should not be
expending their limited resources on cases involving hardly any
domestic conduct, let alone cases that do not affect Americans. 03
Before Morrison, the presumption against extraterritoriality
had been upheld in anti-discrimination and antitrust law.10 4 The
presumption has also been upheld in instances where the
plaintiff is American. 05 In 2004, the US Supreme Court decided
F. Hoffman-LaRoche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., which involved a class
of international consumers alleging that non-US manufacturers
and distributors had engaged in price-fixing.106 The relevant
goods were delivered outside the United States.117 The US
Supreme Court declined to extend antitrust regulations involving
"foreign conduct insofar as that conduct causes independent
foreign harm and that foreign harm alone gives rise to the
plaintiffs' claim." 0 Moreover, the Court announced that it
Congress); e.g., McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de Honduras, 372 U.S.
10, 21-22 (1963); Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, 353 U.S. 138, 147 (1957).
101. See Knox, supra note 100, at 386 (stating that the US Supreme Court has
previously deferred to political branches when faced cases that involve international
affairs); see also Curtis A. Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers:
Rethinking the Interpretive Role of International Law, 86 GEO. L. J. 479, 525 (1998) (stating
that the US Constitution assigns power relating to international affairs to the political
branches and the head of state).
102. See Kahn, supra note 75, at 409-10 (stating that the resources of US courts
are not unlimited and may be better spent on cases that have more than a tangential
connection to the United States); see also White, supra note 4, at 86 (noting that US law
enforcement resources are relevant in discussing extraterritoriality).
103. See Kahn, supra note 75, at 409-10; see also White, supra note 4, at 86.
104. See generally Empagran, 542 U.S. 155 (discussing US antitrust law); Equal
Emp't Opportunity Comm'n v. Arabian Am. Oil Co. ("Aramco"), 499 U.S. 244 (1991)
(discussing the US Civil Rights Act).
105. See Aramco, 499 U.S. at 247, 259 (holding that Title VII of the US Civil
Rights Act does not apply to American citizens employed abroad by American employers
after an American citizen hired by a subsidiary of "Aramco" was discharged, allegedly
because of his race, religion, and national origin).
106. Empagran, 542 U.S. at 159.
107. Id. at 159-60.
108. Id. at 165 (emphasis omitted). The Court elaborated, asking, "[w]hy should
American law supplant, for example, Canada's or Great Britain's or Japan's own
determination about how best to protect Canadian or British or Japanese
customers ... ?" Id. at 166.
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"ordinarily construes ambiguous statutes to avoid unreasonable
interference with the sovereign authority of other nations."l 09
This is consistent with the United States' longstanding views
on extraterritoriality, which are reflected in Sections 402 and 403
of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law
("Restatement").' 10 It is generally permissible for a state to
prescribe law with respect to: "(a) conduct that, wholly or in
substantial part, takes place within its territory; (b) the status of
persons, or interests in things, present within its territory; (c)
conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have
substantial effect within its territory.""' At the same time, Section
403 draws limits on such bases." 2 Exercise of jurisdiction over a
person or activity with "connections to another state" is improper
where it is unreasonable." 3 The following factors, among others,
are listed as relevant to this determination: "character of the
activity to be regulated ... and the degree to which the
desirability of such regulation is generally accepted[,] . .. the
extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating
the activity[,] and the likelihood of conflict with regulation by
another state."" 4 Section 403 goes on to state that if another
state's interest is "clearly greater," then that state should be given
deference.15
The degree of deference owed to the laws of other nations
underpins the conflicting tests for extraterritoriality in Morrison
and Dodd-Frank. Beyond the substantive securities regulations of
other nations, however, consideration must also be given to
broader themes pertaining to economic policy, procedural rules
109. Id. at 164. Commentators have suggested that § 10(b) is one such ambiguous
statute. Section 10(b) derives its legitimacy from the commerce clause, and forbids the
use of "interstate commerce" in effectuating any fraud or deceit. "Interstate commerce"
may include trade or dealing with other nations. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 2, at
215 (stating that the reach of the Exchange Act is ambiguous); see also Testy, supra note
10, at 932 (stating that "interstate commerce" is broadly defined).
110. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN REL. lAw§ 402, 403.
Ill. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN REL.. LAw § 402 (listing the bases by
which jurisdiction over non-US subjects is proper).
112. Id. § 403 (listing circumstances wherein jurisdiction over non-US subjects
would be improper).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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accompanying those regulations, and the spirit of that state's civil
litigation system.
II. COMPETING STANDARDS FOR
EXTRATERRITORIALITY
The transactional test established in Morrison seems to pull
the fulcrum closer to deferring to other jurisdictions better
suited for the claim at hand. Meanwhile, the conduct-and-effect
test proposed in Dodd-Frank makes non-US defendants defer to
US law. This Part discusses the competing standards for
evaluating the extraterritoriality of § 10(b) in Dodd-Frank and in
Morrison. Section A discusses the evolution of the conduct and
effects test that the US Congress is considering extending to
private rights of action in f-cubed litigation, while Section B
examines the Morrison transactional test, including responses
from judges and litigants since its creation.
A. The Conduct Test and the Effects Test
Dodd-Frank combines the tests that existed in American
jurisprudence prior to Morrison. Both the conduct test and the
effects test originated in the US Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit."6 These tests were established to determine whether or
not the US district courts had subject-matter jurisdiction, or
whether Congress "would have wished the precious resources of
the United States courts and law enforcement" to be spent on a
predominantly non-US transaction, instead of leaving the
problem to otherjurisdictions." 7
Section 10(b) had previously been found to apply where it
was "necessary to protect American investors."' In Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook, the Second Circuit eschewed prior consistent
application of the presumption against extraterritoriality, when it
held that § 10(b) applied where a transaction that occurred
outside the United States affected the value of common shares
116. See Schoenbaurn v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200, 206 (2d Cir. 1968), (introducing
the effects test) abrogated by Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010);
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972),
(introducing the conduct test) abrogated by Morrison, 130 S. CL. 2869.
117. Bcrsch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir. 1975), abrogated by
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869.
118. Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 206.
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publicly traded in the United States.'19 Jurisdiction was deemed
proper, and the presumption against extraterritoriality was
rebutted where non-US conduct had an impact on US investors
and markets.120 Some courts have further developed this test by
requiring specific effects, or substantial effects, in the United
States.12' As a general matter, allegations of non-US conduct only
generally affecting the US market have failed the effects test.22
There has not been much difficulty or inconsistency in the
application of this test. 23
Section 10(b) had also been extended to cases where some
of the deceptive conduct occurred in the United States. In Leasco
Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell, the Second Circuit
applied § 10(b) where there was significant conduct that took
place in the United States that brought the defendant within the
purview of US district courts. 24 The conduct test had since been
refined, and courts looked for substantial acts surrounding the
fraudulent activities that occurred in the United States. 25 Under
the conduct test, such acts must not be "merely preparatory" to
the fraud.'26 Some US courts have also singled out causation as a
119. Id. at 208-09 ("This impairment of the value in American investments by
sales by the issuer in a foreign country ... has in our view, a sufliciently serious effect
upon United States commerce to warrant assertion of jurisdiction for the protection of
American investors . . .
120. See id.
121. See, e.g., Bersch, 519 F.2d at 989 (requiring that the injury sustained must
have been from transactions involving purchasers or sellers of securities "in whom the
United States has an interest"); In re Royal Ahold N.V. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 351 F. Supp.
2d 334, 360 (D. Md. 2004) (requiring that the injury be directly sustained by "specific
American investors").
122. See, e.g., Bersch, 519 F.2d at 989 (requiring more than general effects on the
American economy to establish jurisdiction); In re Royal Ahold, 351 F. Supp. 2d at 363
(describing the allegations in the case as too "generalized" for the court to have
jurisdiction).
123. See Kahn, supra note 75, at 375 (acknowledging the straightforward
application of the effects test); see also Buxhaum, supra note 13, at 42-43 (explaining
general principles that facilitate the application of the effects test).
124. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1334 (2d Cir.
1972), abrogated by Morrison v. Nat'1 Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010).
125. See, e.g., IlT, an Int'l Inv. Trust v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1018 (2d Cir.
1975), (stating that the mere occurrence of an act in the United States is not sufficient
for US courts to extend jurisdiction where most of the fraud occurred abroad) abrogated
by Morrison, 130 S. CL. 2869.
126. See, e.g., Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Grp. PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 1995), abrogated
by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869; Bersch, 519 F.2d at 987. Actions that are not "merely
preparatory" may involve the creation of false financial information, transmission of
false financial information overseas, and approval of such false statements prior to
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critical factor, requiring plaintiffs to show that these acts directly
caused their loss. 27
While the conduct test seems straightforward, courts have
faced difficulties with its application.'28 The test has been
criticized as being inconsistently applied and highly susceptible
to manipulation.'29 In following the Second Circuit's lead, the
various circuit courts have issued varying interpretations of the
test.c3o) For example, some courts have looked for additional
"tipping factors" beyond the conduct test to establish jurisdiction
over a predominantly international case."' Extraterritorial
jurisdiction could be determined entirely by how clever litigants
are in identifying and presenting "relevant" conduct that
occurred in the United States. 3 2
The Second Circuit has previously suggested that combining
the two tests would help in examining the connection of the
alleged wrongful conduct to the United States. 33 It is unclear,
transmission. See Scc. & Exch. Comm'n v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 194 (2d Cir. 2003),
abrogated by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869.
127. See, e.g., Itoba, 54 F.3d at 122; Alfadda v. Fenn, 935 F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir.
1991).
128. See, e.g., Morrison, 130 S. CL. at 2879 ("As they developed, these tests were not
easy to administer."); In re Alstom SA Sec. Litig., 406 F. Supp. 2d 346, 368 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) ("The rub, like God and the devil, is in the details of its application.").
129. See Morrison, 130 S. CL. at 2879 ("The conduct test was held to apply
differently depending on whether the harmed investors were Americans or foreigners
. . . ."); see also European Associations Amicus Brief, supra note 72, at 14. Additionally,
the Third, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits have held that "some activities" that "further" the
fraudulent scheme would sulfice to establish jurisdiction. See, e.g., Sec. & Exch. Comm'n
v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1977), abrogated by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869;
Grunenthal GmbH v. Hotz, 712 F.2d 421, 424-25 (9th Cir. 1983), abrogated by Morrison,
130 S. CL. 2869; Cont'l Grain (Austl.) Pty. Ltd. v. Pac. Oilseeds, Inc., 592 F.2d 409, 420
(8th Cir. 1979), abrogated by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869.
130. See Kahn, supra note 75, at 375 ("[T] here is a divergence in the courts' dicta
[T]he perception of a circuit split emerged."); Skadden Memo, supra note 93 at I
(noting that the Supreme Court "provide[d] clarity where itwas very much needed").
131. See, e.g., Eur. & Overseas Commodity Traders, S.A. v. Banque Paribas
London, 147 F.3d 118, 129 (2d Cir. 1998), abrogated by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869;
Interbrew S.A. v. Edperbrascan Corp., 23 F. Supp. 2d, 425, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), abrogated
by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869; see also Buxhaum, supra note 13, at 25.
132. See European Associations Amicus Brief, supra note 72, at 14.
133. See Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Grp. PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 1995) ("[A]n
admixture or combination of the two often gives a better picture of whether there is
sufficient United States involvement tojustify the exercise ofjurisdiction by an American
court."), abrogated by Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 130 S.Ct. 2869 (2010). The
Second Circuit has also applied both tests to one case to see if either would apply. See
Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir. 1975) ("[D]espite the
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however, if requiring both proof of relevant conduct and
significant effects is indicative of expanding or contracting the
reach of § 10(b). 34 Requiring both conduct and effects imposes
an additional burden of proof upon a plaintiff who previously
only had to meet one or the other, thereby creating an additional
roadblock to suing under § 10(b).135 Conversely, a more holistic
approach that considers both conduct and effects, where neither
test would sufficiently trigger jurisdiction, gives judges more
leeway in approaching different factual scenarios.'36
B. The Transactional Test
1. The Morrison Case
Morrison makes it so that courts are not to look for some
wrongful conduct that could tie non-US issuers to the United
States.'37 Instead, Morrison imposes a transactional test that
resolves the split detailed above.'38 In June of 2010, the US
Supreme Court eliminated the private right of action implied in
§ 10(b) where the traded security was not listed on an American
stock exchange, or where the purchase or sale of the security did
not occur in the United States.'3 9 This standard, created in order
to provide stability and predictability to securities litigation,
vigorous but opposing contentions of the parties, neither Schoenbaum or Leasco is
decisive."), abrogated by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869.
134. See Iluxhaum, supra note 13, at 25 (explaining how combining the conduct
test and the effects test could expand or contract the reach of § 10(b)); see also Michael
W. Gordon, United States Extraterritorial Subject Matter jurisdiction in Securities Fraud
Regulation, 10 FIA. J. INT'L L. 487, 531-32 (1996) (suggesting that combining the
conduct test and the effects test would be expanding the reach of US Law).
135. See Buxhaum, supra note 13, at 25 ("[C]ourts could interpret [the
combination] to require that at least some level of both conduct and effects be
established in order to justify the application of U.S. law.").
136. See id. (stating that the test could be satisfied with a combination of the two
elements even if the facts would support neither element alone); see also Gordon, supra
note 134, at 531-32 (explaining a case may involve merely preparatory conduct and
unsubstantial cffects, but taken together would permit the court to find jurisdiction).
137. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2881 (accepting criticisms of the conduct test and
the effects test as justified, instead applying a presumption against extraterritoriality).
138. See id. at 2884 ("[I]t is in our view only transactions in securities listed on
domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other securities, to which § 10(b)
applies."); see also supra note 130.
139. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2888.
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presents a question of substantive law, rather than subject-matter
jurisdiction. 140
In Morrison, non-US investors who purchased shares in what
was then the largest bank in Australia, pursued a civil action in
the Southern District of New York under § 10(b).' 4' The bank's
ordinary shares, or common stock, were not traded on any
exchange in the United States; however, its American Depositary
Receipts were listed on the New York Stock Exchange
("NYSE"). 42 The investors alleged that the bank's financial
statements were false and misleading because one of its American
subsidiaries had misstated the value of its future income from
mortgage service fees. 43 According to the complaint, the bank
had manipulated its financial models to reflect "unrealistically
low" rates of early loan repayment, thus inflating the value of
their mortgage-servicing rights. 44
At the district court level, the bank moved to dismiss on two
grounds: first, for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to
Rule 12(b) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; and
second, for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b) (6).1'4 The
district court granted the Rule 12(b) (1) motion because the acts
in the United States were "at most, a link in the chain of an
alleged overall securities fraud scheme that culminated
abroad."'46 Similarly, the Second Circuit found that acts
performed in the United States did not "compris[e] the heart of
the alleged fraud."l 4 7 The US Supreme Court, however, dismissed
140. See id. at 2877-81 (quoting Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng'rs
& Trainmen Gen. Comm. of Adjustment, 130 S. Ct. 584, 589 (2009) (internal quotation
marks omitted)) ("[T]o ask what conduct § 10(b) reaches is to ask what § 10(b)
prohibits, which is a merits question. Subject-matter jurisdiction, by contrast, 'refers to a
tribunal's power to hear a case."').
141. Id. at 2875. Robert Morrison, an American, was initially involved, but was
dismissed for failure to show damages at the district court level. Id. at 2876 n. 1.
142. Id. at 2875. An American Depositary Receipt ("ADR") is a traded instrument
that facilitates international investing. Each ADR represents shares of non-US stock, or a
fraction of a share. Ownership of an ADR gives the holder the right to obtain the shares
it represents. See id.; see also American Depositary Receipts, U.S. SEC. & ExCH. COMM'N,
http://www.sec.gov/answers/adrs.htm (last visited Apr. 8, 2011)
143. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2876.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. In re Nat'l Austl. Bank Sec. Litig., No. 03 Civ. 6537(BSJ), 2006 WL 3844465, at
*8 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 25, 2006).
147. Morrison v. Nat'1 Austl. Bank Ltd., 547 F.3d 167, 175 (2d Cir. 2008).
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the suit because the transaction occurred in Australia.148 In
dismissing the lawsuit, the US Supreme Court also changed the
extraterritoriality jurisprudence for the future.149
2. The Position of the SEC
The SEC, although ultimately submitting an amicus brief in
support of the Australian bank, expressed its support for a
modified version of the conduct-and-effects test.o50 It is the
position of the US government that a more restrictive standard
for non-US § 10(b) claims could put the United States at risk of
becoming "a base for orchestrating securities frauds for
export."'1 Therefore, according to the SEC, the appropriate
standard would be one that considers the "significant and
material conduct" involved in the transaction.'5 2 If the fraudulent
activity involves significant conduct material to the fraud's
success, and that conduct occurred in the United States, then §
10(b) has been violated 153 Such conduct would include: making
misrepresentations in the United States, instances where the
deceit is "masterminded" in the United States, or instances
where the transaction takes place on US markets.154 The
underlying theory being advanced by the SEC is that § 10(b)
exists to create a "high standard of business ethics in the
securities industry."'5 5 This also serves to protect US investors
against fraud as non-US issuers could potentially direct their
fraudulent activity toward American investors.' 56
The SEC in its amicus brief also favored a greater emphasis
on causation, as it sought to draw focus away from an approach
that looks at "the "'heart' of the fraud."'57 It suggested an
additional requirement that private plaintiffs demonstrate that
direct injury resulted from a component of the fraud that
148. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2888.
149. Id.
150. SeeSEC Amicus Brief, supra note 91, at 17-18.
151. Id.at6.
152. Id. The SEC also pointed out that this is the standard that the SEC uses in
administrative adjudications, and should thus be entitled deference. Id. at 6, 18.
153. Id. at 6, 16.
154. Id. at 16. (citing examples of prior cases).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 17.
157. Id. at 19, 25.
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occurred in the United States. 58 While this requirement imposes
an additional burden on the plaintiff, it may also lower the cost
of international commerce; specifically, the cost of doing
business in the United States.'59
3. Responses to Morrison
As discussed in Part I.B., international bodies have
expressed their objections to the extraterritoriality of US
securities laws. 60 These objections stem from emphasizing the
importance of international comity, particularly given the variety
of securities regulations available across major players in the
global securities market.'6'
The transactional test proposed in Morrison, basing the
application of § 10(b) on the location of the transaction,
however, is not without criticism. In his concurrence, Associate
Justice John Paul Stevens expressed his concern that this "novel
rule" effectively "pays short shrift to the United States' interest in
remedying frauds that . .. harm American citizens . . . ."162
Beyond the public policy issue, district courts have opined that
Morrison could have better defined the test's terms. For example,
Morrison failed to completely discuss what it meant for a purchase
or sale to have been "made in the United States."' 63
Since Morrison was handed down, there has been significant
scrambling to modify pleadings and motions in outstanding class
action suits that were directly affected by the Court's holding.164
Class actions have been trimmed in size, as investors who
purchased shares abroad were removed from the class, thereby
158. Id. at 26.
159. See id. at 27 n.5.
160. See supra Part 1.11. for objections expressed by international bodies regarding
US securities laws and examples of other jurisdictions' regulatory schemes.
161. See supra Part I.B. for examples of otherjurisdictions' regulatory schemes.
162. Morrison v. Nat'1 Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2894-95 (2010) (Stevens,
J., concurring) (setting forth a hypothetical situation wherein an issuer listed on an
international stock exchange whose New York-based subsidiary carried out fraudulent
schemes would he immune from suit by an American investor under the Morrison rule).
163. Plumbers' Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reins. Co., No. 08 Civ.
1958 (JGK), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105720, at*I8--19 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2010).
164. See, e.g., Plumbers Union, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105720, at *27; In re Socidta
G6n&ale Secs. Litig., No. 08 Civ. 2495 (JGK), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107719, at *17-18
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2010); Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., No. 08 Civ. 3758 (VM), 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76543 at *20-22 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2010).
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reducing the millions of dollars in damages at stake.165 Morrison
also negatively affects the securities class action bar, which had
been expanding overseas and offering services to non-US
investors and encouraging them to file suit in the United
States.' 66
Both plaintiffs' and defendants' attorneys have taken
Morrison as an exercise in creative interpretation.167 Plaintiffs,
however, have been unsuccessful at the district court level in
trying to sidestep Morrison.'68 American purchasers of non-US
shares have sought to limit Morrison to its facts.'69 Cornwell v.
Credit Suisse Group and In re Socidtd Gindrale Securities Litigation
attempted to draw the court's attention to pre-sale conduct in the
United States to justify the application of § 10(b), but were
unsuccessful.o7 0 In In re Banco Santander Securities-Optimal
Litigation, the plaintiffs argued that the investor had merely
purchased international securities in order to invest with an
American investment firm, but the court was not persuaded.'7 '
Plaintiffs have also attempted to characterize their transactions as
domestic rather than international where a company's shares are
listed both on the NYSE and elsewhere, or by challenging the
definition of what it means for a share to be "listed." 7 2 These
165. See Koppel & Jones, supra note 65 (reporting the effects of the Mornson
holding on foreign-cubed securities class action suits); see also Tim Sharp, RBS Relief after
Class Action Case Dismissed by judge, HERALD SCOTIAND, Jan. IS, 2011, at 30 (reporting
the effects of the Morrison holding on a class action case against a Scottish bank).
166. See Koppel &Jones, supra note 65 ("[The Morrison ruling] marks another
blow to the securities class-action bar, which in recent years has encouraged foreign
investors to file U.S. suits .... ); see also Buxhaum, supra note 13, at 62 (explaining the
US securities class action bar's efforts to involve non-US claimants in US securities class
actions).
167. See Skadden Memo, supra note 94, at 3. ("We have already seen plaintiffis
taking creative positions in an attempt to avoid the impact of Morrison .... '). See
generally Koppel &Jones, supra note 65 (providing examples of how parties with pending
cases are responding to Morrison).
168. See supra note 164 for examples of cases adversely affected by Morrison.
169. See, e.g., In reSocidt( Grsndrale, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107719, at *16.
170. See Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., No. 08 Civ. 3758 (VM), 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 76543 at *4-6 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2010); In re Societ6 G6ndrale, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 107719, at *18 ("By asking the Court to look to the location of 'the act of placing
a buy order,' . . . Plaintiffs are asking the Court to apply the conduct test specifically
rejected in Morrison.").
171. In re Banco Santander Securities Optimal Litig., No 09-CV-20215-CIV, 2010
WL 3036990, at *6 (S.D. Fla.,July 30, 2010).
172. In reAlstom SA Sec. Litig., 741 F. Supp. 2d 469, 471-72 (S.D.N.Y. 2010)
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too, were unsuccessful. 7 3 Parties have also invoked analogies
from traditional principles of contract law to illustrate loopholes
in Morrison.74 One plaintiff argued that the execution of a
purchase agreement ought to determine whether or not the
transaction occurred abroad.175 However, another court held that
even when a purchase order might electronically pass through a
US server, that is not enough to overcome Morrison.76
Courts have generally responded by drawing attention to
Justice Antonin Scalia's colorful language in recognizing that
some US activity may find its way into a predominantly
international transaction, but that does not mean that every case
is therefore domestic.'77 In their decisions, courts have also
sought to impress upon litigants the importance of international
comity: they decide in a manner that does not contradict
international law. 78 Until the SEC completes its study, for private
causes of action under § 10(b), the "conduct and effect doctrine
took a great fall. And neither Plaintiffs law horses, nor [a]
Court's pen can put the pieces together again."'7 9
173. Id. at 472.
174. See Motion to Dismiss at 12-13, Basis Yield Alpha Fund (Master) v. Goldman
Sachs Grp., No. 10-4537 (S.D.N.Y. filed Sept. 1, 2010) [hereinafter BYAF Motion to
Dismiss] (citing case law and authorities on American contract law supporting the
proposition that the place of contracting is where the acceptance is spoken); see also In re
Socidt G6ndrale, 2010 U.S. Dist. Lexis 107719 at *16 ("'[I]t may be ... appropriate . . .
to look to the common law' to determine the locus of securities transactions." (quoting
Plaintiffs' Sur-Reply at 7-8 In re Sociat6 G6ndrale, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107719)).
175. See BYAF Motion to Dismiss, supra note 174, at 10. As a matter of common
law, the place of contracting is where the "final act binding the parties" occurred. See id.
at 11.
176. See Plumbers' Union Local No. 12 Pension Fund v. Swiss Reinsurance Co.,
No. 08 Civ. 1958 (1GK), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105720, at *23 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 1, 2010).
177. See, e.g., In re Alstom, 741 F. Supp. 2d at 472 (calling attention to justice
Scalia's observations that, "'it is a rare case of prohibited extraterritorial application that
lacks all contact with the territory of the United States"' and that "'the presumption
against extraterritorial application would be a craven watchdog indeed if it retreated to
its kennel whenever some domestic activity is involved in the case"' (quoting Morrison v.
Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2884 (2010))).
178. See, e.g., Plumbers Union, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105720, at *22 (recognizing
that "avoiding "'interference with foreign securities regulation' is of paramount
concern" (quoting Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2886)).
179. Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Grp., No. 08 Civ. 3758 (VM), 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
76543 at *21-22 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2010).
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III. A CASE FOR UPHOLDING MORRISON
Ultimately, the conflict is that Morrison limits the reach of §
10(b) to transactions that occur in the United States, whereas
Dodd-Frank's conduct-and-effects test opens the door to the US
district court for plaintiffs suing non-US issuers. 80 Dodd-Frank
asks the SEC to consider the possibility of limiting the private
right of action, how such an action affects international comity,
the economic costs and benefits of a broad private right of
action, and whether the extraterritoriality standard should be
narrower than what it prescribes for actions brought forth by the
SEC.'8 This Part explains why limiting the private right of action
is questionable, that a sweeping private right of action conflicts
with international laws and thus runs counter to international
comity, and that the economic costs would outweigh the benefits
of such a right of action. Therefore, a narrow extraterritorial
standard, such as the test in Morrison, should apply.
A. International Comity Calls for Boundaries
International comity and US precedent are adverse to
extraterritoriality.18 2 As such, Morrison was correctly decided, and
should not be abrogated in the near future.183 To extend § 10(b)
to private causes of action advanced by plaintiffs who purchased
shares of a non-US issuer on an international stock exchange
would be an impermissible stretch of American authority beyond
the reach of the US Congress and the SEC. First, it is an
unreasonable exercise of jurisdiction pursuant to Section 403 of
the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law.'8 4 Section 402
of the Restatement does permit a state to prescribe law where
international conduct has substantial effects within that state's
180. See supra notes 3, 8 and accompanying text (providing the holding of
Morrison and the relevant provision of the Dodd-Frank Act).
181. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (providing the statutory language of
Dodd-Frank regarding the SEC study).
182. See supra notes 79-80, and accompanying text (explaining the need for
international cooperation in securities regulation and the presumption against
extraterritoriality in American law).
183. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (providing the holding of
Morrison).
184. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text (explaining circumstances
that would make US jurisdiction improper).
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territories.185 Unfortunately, while certain members of Congress
have called for the reversal of Morrison, there have not been any
clear indications as to what standards they would prefer in cases
involving private litigants.'86 As such, there is an additional layer
of complexity for the issuer and the judge.187 This ambiguity
creates speculation on the part of the issuer in trying to comply
with the law. 88 Moreover, as one judge or jury's "substantial" may
be another's "insignificant," cases will once again be handled
inconsistently.' 89 The conduct test itself has proven problematic
in the past; to complicate the effects prong seems unduly
burdensome.190 Furthermore, these ambiguities create additional
problems related to comity.' 9 ' Jurisdictions might differ on what
"substantial" is, which is highly likely, considering jurisdictions
already differ on what "material" means in the context of
material versus immaterial disclosures as required by statute.'19
Such an exercise of jurisdiction is unreasonable because
although regulation of financial markets is desirable, this does
not mean that the United States holds, or ought to hold, a
monopoly on regulatory capabilities.'9 3 Section 403 of the
Restatement lists the "likelihood of conflict with regulation by
another state," as well as the other state's interests, as factors in
determining the reasonableness of jurisdiction.19 4 As discussed
above, other jurisdictions have equally sophisticated, if not more
185. See supra note Ill and accompanying text (explaining when the exercise of
US jurisdiction is permitted).
186. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text (referring to Congress' intent
regarding Morrison).
187. See supra note 128 and accompanying text (referring to the dilliculty judges
have had in applying the conduct test).
188. See supra note 78 and accompanying text (stating that there is a need for
greater clarity in US securities regulations).
189. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (referring to the inconsistent
treatment of foreign-cubed class actions in the past).
190. See supra note 128 and accompanying text (referring to the inconsistent
application of the conduct test).
191. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (referring to the relevance of
international comity).
192. See supra note 72 (providing examples of how jurisdictions differ in their
securities regulations).
193. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (referring to the concerns of other
jurisdictions regarding the reach of US securities law).
194. See supra notes 112-15 and accompanying text (explaining §j 403 of the
Restatement).
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refined, regulatory schemes.9 5 The availability of various other
regulatory schemes would limit the level of regulatory arbitrage
that issues can exploit.'9 Switzerland and Germany, for example,
appear to offer investors at least the same protections available in
the United States.'9 7  Although regulations may differ in
stringency, the degree of stringency in a jurisdiction's laws is a
result of conscious decisions made by that jurisdiction's
authorities. 98 To interfere with those decisions is paternalistic,
possibly offensive, and does little to promote a more unified
global regulatory regime.199
Merely ceding the floor to other regulatory regimes for
private causes of action does not render § 10(b) ineffective. 200
Morrison does not preclude action against American companies,
and Dodd-Frank allows the SEC to pursue actions against non-US
issuers.20' Having two separate tests to determine
extraterritoriality provides opportunities for the US government
to protect its citizens without unduly imposing additional
burdens upon non-US issuers.2012 Dodd-Frank's conduct-and-
effects test adequately alleviates the concerns the SEC expressed
in its amicus brief for Morrison, where it drew attention to the
need for investor protection and preventing the United States
from becoming a locale for international securities fraud.203
195. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text (explaining the securities
regulations of other jurisdictions).
196. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text (explaining the securities
regulations of other jurisdictions).
197. See supra notes 85-90, 92 and accompanying text (explaining Switzerland and
Germany's securities regulations).
198. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text (describing other jurisdictions'
efforts to prohibit securities fraud).
199. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (referring to the reaction of
international capitals to Dodd-Frank).
200. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (discussing the enforcement
powers of the SEC).
201. See supra notes 3, 8 and accompanying text (explaining how the SEC retains
enforcement powers, including over American companies and non-US issuers who list
shares in the US).
202. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (clarifying the role of the US
government in securities fraud regulations).
203. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (explaining the SEC's concerns
regarding this issue).
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B. Redress for American Investors
Having a separate test for actions instituted by the SEC
responds to Justice Stevens' concerns over Americans choosing to
purchase non-US shares on an international exchange. 2()4
Affected Americans wishing to file private suits will have to do so
elsewhere because of Morrison.205 Still, they can rely on the SEC to
commence suits in the United States against non-US issuers who
have engaged in fraudulent conduct and caused detrimental
effects in the United States.o 6 At the very least, increasing the
importance of the SEC's role in such transactions may pressure
them to do their job well, as investors may be unable to pursue
"justice" on their own. Nevertheless, American investors may
have to accept that American law will not always protect them
when they choose to engage in securities transactions outside US
borders.2017 Such is a cost of doing business abroad.208 Basic due
diligence will inform the rational investor that the particular
security he or she is purchasing is priced to include information
pertaining to the legal system governing that stock. 209 Moreover,
purchasing shares abroad, and thereby supporting other
economies, can be construed as impliedly giving up the right to
sue in the United States.210
If the ability to litigate in US courts is important to the
investor, then he or she should consider purchasing shares listed
on US stock exchanges rather than those listed abroad.2 11 Still,
should something untoward happen in the future, the SEC does
204. See supra note 162 and accompanying text (referring to justice Stevens'
opinion).
205. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 30 and accompanying text (clarifying the role of the SEC in
multinational securities fraud actions).
207. See supra note 139 and accompanying text (explaining the Supreme Court's
holding in Morrison, which represents an example where American investors who
invested abroad, were not protected by US law).
208. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (referring to the costs of
participating in worldwide commerce).
209. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (stating that the price of the
security reflects all available information, including the regulatory scheme governing the
security).
210. See supra note 84 and accompanying text (referring to the costs of
participating in worldwide commerce).
211. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
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have the authority to intervene on the investor's behalf.212 To also
permit the investor to sue individually, or with others similarly
situated as a class, gives the investor at least two opportunities to
recover from the defendant: one with the SEC, which
redistributes any collected monies to injured investors, and
another in private litigation. 213 A third action might be possible,
or even necessary, if the issuer is in a jurisdiction that does not
recognize US judgments.214 Having multiple causes of action for
the same conduct in different jurisdictions is simply inefficient
for plaintiffs, and causes the defendant issuer to expend more
resources in response. 215 Regardless of whether the defendant
settles out of court or staunchly defends itself, multiple actions
detract the issuer from rehabilitating its share price by improving
its operations or engaging in activities that would promote
growth and development. 16 Considering the weakened state of
the US economy, issuers should not need to worry about being
sued in multiple courtrooms, each time under different legal
standards, when their efforts could be better placed in
stimulating business and economic growth.217
C. Legal Costs of Doing Business in the United States
The transactional test makes economic sense: it could level
the legal costs of doing business in the United States and make
the US financial market more competitive.218 The implications of
the transactional test upon the US economy are yet to be seen.219
Nonetheless, facilitating international trade and cooperation, as
well as attracting investment in US financial markets should be a
212. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text (referring to the SEC's
enforcement powers).
213. See supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing the results of SEC
enforcement actions).
214. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (recognizing Germany as a
jurisdiction that refuses to recognize US judgments).
215. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (referring to the resources required
to defend a securities fraud claim).
216. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (referring to the potential problems
raised by shareholder litigation).
217. See supra notes 49, 57 and accompanying text (referring to the need to
stabilize securities markets and how shareholder litigation may have opposite effect).
218. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (referring to the unpredictability of
the US legal system and how it can cost the US market).
219. See supra note 163 and accompanying text (referring to most recent case
decided under Morrison at time of this writing).
2011] REVISITING MORRISON IN LIGHT OF DODD-FRANK 1579
priority for the US government. 220 Having a regulatory system
that is more predictable, or at least one that permits issuers to
carry out its plans with a minimum risk of being surprised by the
US common law system, is a step towards that direction.22' For
example, Chinese enterprises with substantial resources might
prefer to list their shares elsewhere, such as Switzerland, rather
than the NYSE, if doing so limits their exposure to a ravenous
plaintiffs bar.2 22 Alternatively, the hypothetical issuer might be
looking for a jurisdiction that provides, with greater clarity, the
standards of behavior to which it must adhere; a jurisdiction that
will not suddenly impose additional obligations via the class
action mechanism.22 1 It is advantageous for the United States to
not increase the legal cost of doing business within its borders.
However, the conduct-and-effects test will make multinationals
think twice about setting up operations in the United States,
potentially taking talent away from the US job market as well. 2 24
When non-US issuers purposely seek to do business in the
United States by utilizing exchanges such as NASDAQ or the
NYSE, and availing themselves of the benefits of listing in the
United States, then they are voluntarily responsible for any
attendant liability that might result from their choice to do
business in US territory.225 If they choose not to list in the United
States, it is preferable to leave the cause of action in the hands of
a court that is better equipped to exert power over non-US
issuers and to interpret the laws that such an issuer must abide
by.226 If international issuers find themselves the target of legal
action in the United States, they may raise arguments grounded
220. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text (explaining effects of US
securities litigation upon US financial market).
221. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text (stating that clarity and
predictability arc two areas in which US securities regulation could be improved).
222. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (referring to jurisdictions that do
not permit securities class actions).
223. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (suggesting that issuers place a
premium on clear and predictable regulations).
224. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text (recognizing the economic
risks involved with the US legal system).
225. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (referring to the rules issuers on
American exchanges must adhere to).
226. See supra note 71-74 and accompanying text (referring to the regulatory
schemes in place elsewhere).
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in foreign law in their defense.2 7 US courts may be ill-suited to
evaluate such arguments.228 Moreover, there is a risk of ending
up with a judgment that is unenforceable in the issuer's home
state.229 To go through the rigmarole of litigating in the United
States, only to achieve a moral victory is probably not what the
plaintiff, or the plaintiff's attorney, are looking for.230
D. Risks Presented by Abusive Litigation
The United States should not open itself up to plaintiffs
hoping to take advantage of the United States' entrepreneurial
legal system with the aid of attorneys willing to search every
securities transaction with a fine-toothed comb to find some
tenuous connection to the United States.23 ' Moreover, cases that
can be resolved elsewhere should not crowd the federal court
docket.2 32 To do so is an unnecessary use of a contracting pool of
resources. 233
It could, however, be argued that US courts now know
better, and are better able to efficiently discern what is actionable
under § 10(b) thanks to the prior case law surrounding the
conduct-and-effects test.2 34 Furthermore, a two-part test, while
approachable on paper, might actually be a difficult bar for the
plaintiff to meet.23 5 Plaintiffs would have to show both relevant
conduct and substantial effects before proceeding with the
litigation, whereas they only had to show one of the two before
227. See supra note 72 and accompanying text (providing examples of foreign law
that might be involved in an issuers' defense).
228. See supra note 74 and accompanying text (referring to the differences
between a civil law system and a common law system)
229. See supra note 92 and accompanying text (referring to a German law
restricting venue for securities fraud actions to the issuer's home state).
230. See supra note 46 and accompanying text (referring to the interests of
plaintiffs and their attorneys).
231. See supra note 166 and accompanying text (referring to the initiatives of
plaintiffs' firms).
232. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text (referring to the limited
resources of the US federal court system).
233. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
234. See supra notes 117-27 and accompanying text (referring to the range of case
law available on the conduct test and the effects test).
235. See supra note 134 and accompanying text (explaining how the conduct-and-
effects test could be a difficult standard to meet).
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Morrison.2 36 Such a standard would, however, leave the door wide
open to creative pleading, which has previously been deemed
problematic.17
More importantly, a high standard might also encourage
plaintiffs to commence nuisance suits in efforts to purposefully
distract corporations.238 Corporations hoping to limit the costs of
discovery and defending a claim, in addition to the negative
publicity that could affect their costs of capital, might continue
with the practice of reaching a settlement agreement in the
interests of efficiency rather than encouraging truly meritorious
cases.239 These costs are unnecessary expenses that the securities
industry would have to shoulder. 240 Meanwhile, Morrison offers a
degree of swiftness in resolving the applicability of § 10(b) as the
primary question is the location of the transaction. 241 This test
could also be more cost-effective if issuers clearly identified the
location of the transaction in the agreement pertaining to the
sale, thus reducing the costs of having to obtain that information.
E. Institutional Investors
Dodd-Frank also mentions the possibility of restricting the
availability of a broader private right of action to institutional
investors only.24 2 Pension funds would likely benefit the most
from the use of the conduct-and-effects test.24 3 Nevertheless, the
general public usually wishes to have their day in a domestic
court. Not every investor is part of a pension fund, and larger
investment firms tend to impose minimum investment
236. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text (discussing the practical
implications of the conduct-and-ellects test).
237. See supra note 167 and accompanying text (referring to the risk of creative
pleading).
238. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text (explaining problems
associated with nuisance litigation).
239. See supra note 48 and accompanying text (recognizing the practice of settling
claims without litigation).
240. See supra note 57 and accompanying text (referring to the cost of litigation
affecting the securities industry).
241. See supra note 137-38 and accompanying text (providing the transactional
test imposed by Morrison).
242. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (suggesting that the private action
under § 10(b) be limited to institutional investors).
243. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (explaining how pension funds are
involved in securities class action suits).
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requirements that can be difficult to meet. Furthermore,
institutional investors like investment banks and hedge funds
have also been sued by their shareholders under § 10(b), for
issues such as poor risk management practices. 2 " Additionally,
extraterritoriality might not even be an issue considering the
highly global nature of such institutions.245 For example, the
international offices of firms such as The Goldman Sachs Group,
Inc., or Credit Suisse Group AG could be protected by a test like
Morrison, but they have domestic operations that are fully within
the purview of § 10(b).
Limiting the private right to institutional investors is,
however, counterintuitive. An institutional investor probably
possesses greater knowledge and understanding of market forces,
and would therefore be less susceptible to securities fraud, or
could take proactive steps to prevent it. Thus, the private right of
action under § 10(b) might be rarely used in practice.
The factors that Congress provided for the SEC's
consideration as listed in § 929Y of the Dodd-Frank Act would
likely point the SEC toward rejecting the extension of the
conduct-and-effects test to private rights of action. Successful
international cooperation in controlling securities markets calls
for the transactional test in Morrison. The economic risks
associated with the conduct-and-effects test, not to mention its
procedural shortcomings, outweigh its benefits. Furthermore, the
interests of American investors are not seriously undermined.
Morrison was correctly decided and should not be overturned.
CONCLUSION
Extending the conduct-and-effects test, thereby extending
the extraterritorial reach of US securities law, to private rights of
action is problematic as a matter of international comity. This is
due to the fact that jurisdictions prefer to approach securities
fraud differently, as some jurisdictions prefer law enforcement
over litigation. Moreover, jurisdictions define ideas pertaining to
securities fraud differently. These differences are pivotal in
244. See supra note 164 (citing Cornwell v. Credit Suisse Group, No. 08 Civ. 3758,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 76543, involving a securities fraud action against an investment
bank).
245. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (noting the general globalization of
commerce).
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determining who wins and who loses in high stakes litigation. In
the interest of global financial stability and cooperation, which is
very much needed at the present time, it would be unwise to
impose US securities law upon non-US issuers, or upon non-US
stock exchanges. As it is, international issuers have to balance the
regulatory requirements of their home states with the rules of the
particular securities exchange on which they have listed their
shares. The United States should be very clear as to what is
expected of non-US issuers to help them navigate, and comply
with, the complexities of the American regulatory framework.
